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Abstract
We consider a fair division setting where indivisi-
ble items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the
setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly posi-
tive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinc-
tion between items that are good for some agents
and bad for other agents (i.e. mixed), good for ev-
eryone (i.e. goods) or bad for everyone (i.e. bads).
For this model, we study axiomatic concepts of al-
locations such as jealousy-freeness up to one item,
envy-freeness up to one item and Pareto-optimality.
We obtain many new possibility and impossibility
results in regard to combinations of these proper-
ties. We also investigate new computational tasks
related to such combinations. Thus, we advance
the state-of-the-art in fair division of mixed manna.
1 Introduction
Consider a Foodbank problem where donated food is given
out to people in need. Such shelters exist in many countries
around the world. Although some people would gladly accept
any “free-of-charge” food, other people might find some of it
undesirable. Thus, people may like some food items and dis-
like others. Also, consider a paper assignment problem where
scientific papers are matched to reviewers. Although review-
ers tend to bid for papers from their own field of expertise,
they might as well have to bid for papers from other areas.
Thus, they receive papers they like and also often papers they
dislike. Both of these problems can be modeled mathemati-
cally as resource allocations of indivisible items to agents.
Resource allocation of indivisible items lies on the in-
tersection of fields such as social choice theory, computer
science and algorithmic economics. Though a large body
of work is devoted to the case when the items are goods
(e.g. [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Moulin, 2003; Hugo, 1948;
Young, 1995]), there is a rapidly growing interest in the
case of mixed manna (e.g. [Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2019;
Aziz et al., 2019b; Caragiannis et al., 2012; Sandomirskiy
and Segal-Halevi, 2019]). In a mixed manna, each item can
be classified as mixed (i.e. some agents strictly like it and
other agents strictly dislike it), good (i.e. all agents weakly
like it and some agents strictly like it) or bad (i.e. all agents
weakly dislike it and some agents strictly dislike it).
An allocation of the manna gives to each agent some dif-
ferent bundle of items. A common task in resource alloca-
tion is to compute an allocation that minimizes the inequali-
ties between the agents’ utilities for their bundles. A central
axiomatic property that encodes this objective is equitability.
An allocation is equitable if all agents derive exactly the same
utility from their bundles (i.e. perfect equitability). Unfortu-
nately, such allocations might not exist even with two agents
and one item. In response, we might consider approximate
versions of equitability. For example, we might require that
pairwise perfect equitability is restored whenever one item is
moved across the agents’ bundles. However, it might also not
be possible to achieve this version simply because it requires
that the agents’ altered utilities become perfectly equal.
We receive an inspiration from the work of Gourve`s et
al. [2014] in order to relax the “perfect equitability” require-
ment. They proposed an axiomatic property such as jealousy-
freeness which does precisely this. An agent is jealous of an-
other agent in a given allocation if the utility of the former
agent for their own bundle is strictly lower than the utility
of the latter agent for their own bundle. Otherwise, the for-
mer agent is jealousy-free of the latter agent. For any pair of
agents, it is always the case that one of them is jealousy-free
of the other one. However, a given allocation is jealousy-free
if no agent is jealous of any other agent. Thus, such an al-
location is also equitable. On the plus side, this means that
there is zero inequality in it. On the minus side, it also means
that such an allocation might not exist.
In this paper, we analyse four new relaxations of jealousy-
freeness (i.e. JF1, JF10, JFX and JFX0) for allocations of
the manna. They insist on achieving jealousy-freeness by
decreasing the utilities of jealousy-free agents in “up to one
item” fashion. For example, an allocation is JF1 if each agent
is jealousy-free of any other agent or, otherwise, an agent who
is jealous becomes jealousy-free of another agent, after some
non-zero valued bad from the jealous agent’s bundle is added
to the other agent’s bundle or some non-zero valued good
is removed from the other agent’s bundle. JFX strengthens
these requirements to each bad in the jealous agent’s bundle
and each good in the other agent’s bundle. Furthermore, JF10
and JFX0 relax the “non-zero valued” requirements imposed
by JF1 and JFX, respectively. We will shortly observe the
following relations between these properties.
JFX0 ⇒ JFX ⇒ JF10 ⇒ JF1
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properties agents items manna with mixed items
PO ≥ 2 ≥ 1 X, leximin (Rem 1)
JF1 ≥ 2 ≥ 3 × (Prop 1?), NP-hard (Thm 1?)
EFX+PO 2 ≥ 1 X, leximin (Thm 5?)
manna without mixed items
goods and bads pure goods and bads
JFX0; EFX0 ≥ 2 ≥ 3 ×; × (Prop 2?), open
JF10 ≥ 2 ≥ 1 X, Algorithm 1 (Thm 3)
JFX ≥ 2 ≥ 1 X, leximin++ (Thm 2)
JF1+PO ≥ 2 ≥ 2 × (Prop 3?), NP-hard (Thm 4?)
JFX+PO ≥ 2 ≥ 1 X, leximin (Cor 1)
JF1+EF1 ≥ 2 ≥ 2 × (Prop 4), open
JFX+EFX 2 ≥ 1 X, leximin++ (Thm 6?)
JFX+EFX+PO 2 ≥ 1 × (Prop 5?), open X, leximin (Cor 2?)
JF1+EF1 ≥ 3 > n × (Prop 6?), open
JF1+EF1 ≥ 3 ≤ n × (Prop 7?), open
JF1+EF1 ≥ 2 ≥ 4 × (Prop 8??), open
Table 1: Results for n ≥ 2 agents: X-possible, ×-not possible, ?-normalised additive utilities, ??-normalised general utilities.
(a) mixed manna (b) goods & bads (c) goods & bads (d) pure goods & bads
Figure 1: Combinations for n ≥ 2 agents: the generalized envy-free algorithm from [Aziz et al., 2019a],
leximin from [Dubins and Spanier, 1961], leximin++ from [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018], Algorithm 1 from our work.
We also investigate how these properties interact with com-
mon efficiency and fairness criteria such as Pareto-optimality
(PO) and envy-freeness up to one item (EF1, EFX and EFX0).
PO ensures that we cannot re-distribute items among agents’
bundles so that we make every agent weakly happier and
some agent strictly happier. EF1 and EFX for our model
are from [Aziz et al., 2019a]. For example, EF1 requires
that an agent’s envy for another agent’s bundle is eliminated
by removing some item from these agents’ bundles. EFX
strengthens EF1 to any non-zero valued item in these bundles,
increasing the envy agent’s utility or decreasing the other
agent’s utility. EFX0 extends envy-freeness up to any (pos-
sibly zero valued) good from [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]
to any (possibly zero valued) bad. These fairness properties
obey the following well-known pattern.
EFX0 ⇒ EFX ⇒ EF1
2 Our contributions
We highlight in this section our results. Although we empha-
sise in our work on possibility and impossibility results, we
report some computational results as well. Table 1 contains
all results. Figures 1 and 2 depict most of them and some
existing results. Some possibility results rely on exponential-
time solutions such as leximin and leximin++. Others rely on
polynomial-time solutions such as Algorithm 1. In particular,
our findings give answers to the following question regarding
combinations of JF1, EF1 and PO.
Question: When does it exist an allocation that
satisfies a given combination of JF1, EF1 and PO?
We first report our results for the new properties JF1, JF10,
JFX and JFX0.
• We start by proving that JF1 allocations might not ex-
ist in problems with mixed items. (Proposition 1). The
related decision problem is NP-hard (Theorem 1).
• By comparison, JFX0 allocations might not exist in
problems without mixed items (Proposition 2).
• Further, we show that each leximin++ allocation in
such problems is JFX (Theorem 2).
• We also show that Algorithm 1 returns an JF10 alloca-
tion in such problems (Theorem 3).
We further summarize our results for combinations, includ-
ing PO but excluding EF1, EFX and EFX0.
• The leximin solution satisfies PO (Remark 1).
• JF1 and PO might be incompatible even in problems
with as many goods as agents (Proposition 3). The re-
lated decision problem is NP-hard (Theorem 4).
• Nevertheless, each leximin allocation of pure goods (i.e.
all agents strictly like them) and bads is JFX and PO
(Corollary 1).
We lastly list our results for other combinations, including
also EF1, EFX and EFX0. Some of these add solely to the
literature of EF1, EFX, EFX0 and PO.
• For the case of 2 agents, EFX0 allocations might not ex-
ist in problems without mixed items (Proposition 2).
• On the contrary, each leximin allocation is EFX and PO
with normalised additive utilities for any manna (Theo-
rem 5), and JFX for pure goods and bads (Corollary 2).
• We additionally show that each leximin++ allocation
is JFX and EFX with normalised utilities for goods and
bads (Theorem 6).
• At the end, we prove that JF1, EF1 and PO are incom-
patible in various contexts:
1. n = 2 agents and non-normalised additive utilities
for m = 2 pure bads (i.e. all agents strictly dislike
them) (Proposition 4),
2. n = 2 agents and normalised additive utilities for
m = 4 goods and bads (Proposition 5),
3. n = 3 agents and normalised additive utilities for
m = 6 pure goods (Proposition 6),
4. n = 3 agents and normalised additive utilities for
m = 3 pure bads (Proposition 7), and
5. n = 2 agents and normalised general utilities for
m = 4 pure goods (Proposition 8).
(a) mixed manna (b) goods & bads
Figure 2: Combinations for 2 agents and norm. additive utilities.
Although leximin and leximin++ are exponential-time so-
lutions, they often come with nice axiomatic guarantees. For
this reason, we feel that their computability would not be
problematic in settings with few items [Bliem et al., 2016].
3 Related work
Jealousy-freeness up to one item relates to near jealousy-
freeness for matroids from [Gourve`s et al., 2014]. In fact,
JFX0 and JFX coincide with this notion in their setting.
Hence, their near jealousy-freeness algorithm returns JFX0
allocations in problems with additive utilities for pure goods.
By comparison, we prove that such allocations stop to exist as
soon as we add bads to the problem. Other works of matroids
are [Gourve`s et al., 2013a] and [Gourve`s et al., 2013b]. They
also consider only positive-valued utility functions whereas
we consider real-valued utility functions.
Jealousy-freeness up to one item appears to be an ideal
complement to minimizing inequality. To elaborate further
on this, let us consider the popular Gini index [Gini, 1912].
Aleksandrov and Walsh [Aleksandrov et al., 2019] showed
that each allocation that minimizes the Gini index in some
problems with pure goods might not share any PO guarantees.
In contrast, we prove that JFX and PO allocations always ex-
ist in problems with pure goods and bads. Other works of
inequalities are [Endriss, 2013] and [Schneckenburger et al.,
2017]. However, they consider inequality measures for allo-
cations of goods whereas we consider inequality properties
for allocations of goods, bads and mixed items.
Jealousy-freeness up to one item further relates to existing
approximations of equitability. Freeman et al. [2019] pro-
posed two such notions in the context of goods (i.e. EQ1 and
EQX). They proved that the leximin solution is EQX and PO
in problems with pure goods. Freeman et al. [2020] further
studied EQ1 and EQX in the context of bads. However, they
discovered that this solution is no longer EQ1 and no other al-
location is EQX and PO. In response, they proposed two no-
tions of equitability up to one duplicated item (i.e. DEQ1 and
DEQX) and showed that each of them is compatible with PO.
Notably, EQ1, EQX for goods and DEQ1, DEQX for bads
require like our properties for mixed manna that jealousy-
freeness is restored by diminishing the jealousy-free agents’
utilities. As a consequence, JF10 and JFX degenerate respec-
tively to EQ1, EQX for goods and DEQ1, DEQX for bads.
Jealousy-freeness up to one item does not relate much to
EF1. For example, Aziz et al. [2019a] gave the generalized
envy-graph algorithm for computing EF1 allocations. At the
same time, we show that JF1 allocations might not exist in
problems with mixed items and prove that the related com-
putational problem is NP-hard. For problems without mixed
items, we give a greedy algorithm for computing JF10 allo-
cations. Nevertheless, even with pure goods in the problem,
we prove that JF1 and EF1 cannot be achieved together. As a
result, other existing EF1 approaches (e.g. the MNW solution
from [Caragiannis et al., 2016]) may fail JF1 and also new
JF1 approaches (e.g. our greedy algorithm) may fail EF1.
Jealousy-freeness up to one item relates even less to EFX
and EFX0. Caragiannis et al. [2016] proposed EFX for goods.
Although EF1 allocations exist, it remained an open question
in the last years whether EFX allocations exist in general. We
close the case of 2 agents for our model with normalised ad-
ditive utilities. For example, the leximin allocation is EFX
and PO in such problems whereas the leximin++ allocation
is EFX and JFX in such problems without mixed items. Plaut
and Roughgarden [2018] considered EFX0 even though Ky-
ropoulou et al. [2019] coined the name. EFX0 allocations
exist in problems with 2 agents and goods. This may not be
true in our setting even with just 2 agents.
Seemingly, some of our results rely on the leximin++ so-
lution [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]. This solution has re-
ceived less attention than the leximin solution (e.g. [Rawls,
1971; Sen, 1976; Sen, 1977]). The leximin solution is PO.
However, we give problems with goods where it may fail JF1
whereas the leximin++ solution is JFX even with bads but it
may not be PO. Computing the leximin and leximin++ solu-
tions relates to computing max-min fair allocations which is
NP-hard [Beza´kova´ and Dani, 2005; Dobzinski and Vondra´k,
2013]. Other related works are listed in [Freeman et al., 2019;
Freeman et al., 2020] and [Aziz et al., 2019a]. However, our
results do not follow from existing results.
4 Formal preliminaries
In this section, we define more formally the model of fair di-
vision of mixed manna, the aforementioned axiomatic prop-
erties for allocations in this model as well as the leximin and
leximin++ solutions.
4.1 Model
We consider a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n ∈ N≥2 agents and
a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of m ∈ N≥1 indivisible items. We
let each a ∈ [n] have some utility function ua : 2[m] → R
Thus, they assign some bundle utility ua(M) to each bun-
dle M ⊆ [m]. We write ua(o) for ua({o}). We con-
sider mostly additive utilities for bundles of items. That is,
ua(M) =
∑
o∈M ua(o). Also, we sometimes consider nor-
malised utilities. In this case, we suppose that ua(∅) = 0 and
ua([m]) = c hold for each a ∈ [n] and some c ∈ R.
With additive utilities, the set of items [m] can be parti-
tioned into mixed items, goods and bads. Respectively, we
write [m]± = {o ∈ [m]|∃a ∈ [n] : ua(o) > 0,∃b ∈
[n] : ub(o) < 0}, [m]+ = {o ∈ [m]|∀a ∈ [n] : ua(o) ≥
0,∃b ∈ [n] : ub(o) > 0} and [m]− = {o ∈ [m]|∀a ∈
[n] : ua(o) ≤ 0,∃b ∈ [n] : ub(o) < 0} for the sets of these
items. We refer to an item o from [m]+ as a pure good if
∀a ∈ [n] : ua(o) > 0. Also, we refer to an item o from [m]−
as a pure bad if ∀a ∈ [n] : ua(o) < 0.
4.2 Axiomatic properties
An (complete) allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is such that
(1) Aa is the set of items allocated to agent a ∈ [n], (2)
∪a∈[n]Aa = [m] and (3) Aa ∩ Ab = ∅ for each a, b ∈ [n]
with a 6= b. We consider several properties for allocations.
Jealousy-freeness up to one item Let us consider an al-
location and a pair of agents, say 1 and 2. One of them is
jealousy-free of the other one, say 2. Our approximations of
jealousy-freeness rely on the idea of decreasing the utility of
the agent who is jealousy-free, i.e. 2’s utility.
Thus, agent 1 is JF1 of agent 2 whenever 1’s utility is at
least as much as 2’s utility, after taking a non-zero valued bad
from 1’s bundle and adding it to 2’s bundle or removing a
non-zero valued good from 2’s bundle.
Definition 1. (JF1) An allocation A is jealousy-free up to
some non-zero valued item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab),
∃o ∈ Aa s.t. ua(Aa) < ua(Aa \ {o}): ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab ∪
{o}) or ∃o ∈ Ab s.t. ub(Ab) > ub(Ab \ {o}): ua(Aa) ≥
ub(Ab \ {o}).
Agent 1 is JFX of agent 2 whenever the above requirements
hold for any bad in 1’s bundle, strictly increasing 1’s utility,
and any good in 2’s bundle, strictly decreasing 2’s utility.
Definition 2. (JFX) An allocation A is jealousy-free up to
any non-zero valued item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], (1) ∀o ∈ Aa s.t.
ua(Aa) < ua(Aa \ {o}): ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab ∪ {o}) and (2)
∀o ∈ Ab s.t. ub(Ab) > ub(Ab\{o}): ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab\{o}).
JF1 is a strictly weaker concept than JFX. Indeed, there are
problems where a JF1 allocation might violate JFX. Interest-
ingly, this can be observed even in problems where agents
have the same utility for each item.
Example 1. Let us consider a problem with 2 agents and 3
pure bads, subject to the utilities in the below matrix.
a b c
agent 1 −1 −2 −3
agent 2 −1 −2 −3
The allocation A = ({a, c}, {b}) is such that u1(A1) =
−4 < −3 = u2(A2 ∪ {a}) and u1(A1) = −4 > −5 =
u2(A2 ∪ {c}) hold. Hence, A is JF1 but not JFX.
By comparison, an allocation that satisfies JFX is clearly
JF1. This follows directly by these concepts’ definitions.
Freeman et al. [2019] considered a stronger variant of JF1
for problems with goods, not-imposing the non-zero marginal
requirements. We generalize this concept to our setting in a
similar fashion.
Definition 3. (JF10) An allocation A is jealousy-free up to
some item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab), ∃o ∈ Aa:
ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab∪{o}) or ∃o ∈ Ab: ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab\{o}).
Freeman et al. [2020] also defined similarly a stronger no-
tion than JFX for problems with bads. We generalize this
concept to our setting by relaxing the non-zero marginal re-
quirements and refer to it as JFX0.
Definition 4. (JFX0) An allocation A is jealousy-free up to
any item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], (1) ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab ∪ {o}) for each
o ∈ Aa s.t. ua(Aa) ≤ ua(Aa \ {o}) and (2) ua(Aa) ≥
ub(Ab \ {o}) for each o ∈ Ab s.t. ub(Ab) ≥ ub(Ab \ {o}).
A JFX0 allocation is also JFX. Moreover, JFX is stronger
than JF10 and JF10 is stronger than JF1. These relations fol-
low directly by the definitions of these concepts.
Envy-freeness up to one item Envy-freeness up to one
item requires that an agent’s envy for another’s bundle is
eliminated by removing an item from the bundles of these
agents. Two notions for our model that are based on this idea
are EF1 and EFX [Aziz et al., 2019a].
Definition 5. (EF1) An allocation A is envy-free up to some
item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], ua(Aa) ≥ ua(Ab) or ∃o ∈ Aa ∪ Ab s.t.
ua(Aa \ {o}) ≥ ua(Ab \ {o}).
Definition 6. (EFX) An allocation A is envy-free up to any
non-zero valued item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], (1) ∀o ∈ Aa s.t. ua(Aa)
< ua(Aa \ {o}): ua(Aa \ {o}) ≥ ua(Ab) and (2) ∀o ∈ Ab
s.t. ua(Ab) > ua(Ab \ {o}): ua(Aa) ≥ ua(Ab \ {o}).
Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] considered a variant of EFX
for goods where, for any given pair of agents, the removed
item may be valued with zero utility by the envy agent. Ky-
ropoulou et al. [2019] referred to this one as EFX0. We adapt
this property to our model by relaxing the non-zero marginal
requirements in the definition of EFX.
Definition 7. (EFX0) An allocation A is envy-free up to any
item if, ∀a, b ∈ [n], (1) ua(Aa \ {o}) ≥ ua(Ab) for each
o ∈ Aa s.t. ua(Aa) ≤ ua(Aa \ {o}) and (2) ua(Aa) ≥
ua(Ab \ {o}) for each o ∈ Ab s.t. ua(Ab) ≥ ua(Ab \ {o}).
An allocation that is EFX0 further satisfies EFX. Also,
EFX is stronger than EF1. It is well-known that the oppo-
site relations might not hold.
Pareto-optimality Vilfredo Pareto had proposed its opti-
mality a long time ago in his seminal work [Pareto, 1897].
We next define it formally for allocations in our model.
Definition 8. (PO) An allocation A is Pareto-optimal if there
is no allocation B that Pareto-improves A, i.e. ∀a ∈ [n]:
ua(Ba) ≥ ua(Aa) and ∃b ∈ [n]: ub(Bb) > ub(Ab).
4.3 Leximin and leximin++
Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] implemented one operator for
comparing allocations: . This operator induces a total order
between allocations. Thus, an leximin allcation is a maximal
element under this order. Such an allocation maximizes the
minimum utility of any agent, subject to which the second
minimum utility is maximized, and so on. For this reason,
each leximin allocation is trivially PO.
Remark 1. In fair division of mixed manna, each leximin
allocation is PO.
Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] further proposed another to-
tal operator for comparing allocations: ++ They refer to the
maximal elements under it as leximin++ allocations. Such
an allocation maximizes the minimum utility, then maximizes
the size of the bundle of an agent with minimum utility, be-
fore it maximizes the second minimum utility and the size of
the second minimum utility bundle, and so on. Unfortunately,
leximin++ allocations might generally not be PO.
Freeman et al. [2020] noted that there might multiple lex-
imin allocations in some problems. Perhaps, the most rela-
vant to us is that this observation holds for leximin++ allo-
cations as well (see Example 1).
5 Common assumptions
An allocation in a problem with non-normalised utilities is
envy-free up to one item or Pareto-optimal if and only if it
is envy-free up to one item or Pareto-optimal in the corre-
sponding problem with normalised utilities. This might not
be true for a concept such as jealousy-freeness up to one item
because normalisation reduces the agents’ total utilities.
Example 2. Let us consider the first problem with 4 goods
and 2 agents. The second problem is its normalised version.
a b c d
non-normalised
agent 1 1 1 1 1
agent 2 1 0 0 0
normalised
agent 1 14
1
4
1
4
1
4
agent 2 1 0 0 0
The only JF1 and PO allocation with normalised utilities
is A = ({b, c, d}, {a}): agent 2 gets utility 1 and agent 1
gets utility 34 . However, A falsifies JF1 with non-normalised
utilities: agent 1 gets 1 and agent 2 gets 3. 
Additionally, an allocation that ignores agents with zero
utilities for items is envy-free up to one item or Pareto-
optimal wrt the ignored agents. Again, this may not be true
for jealousy-freeness up to one item. In fact, the only way to
achieve this concept in some problems might be to give items
to such agents.
Example 3. Let us consider the below problem with 4 goods
and 2 agents, having 0/1 utilities for the items.
a b c d
agent 1 1 1 1 1
agent 2 0 0 0 0
If we ignore agent 2, allocating all items to agent 1 is EF1
and PO but it is not even JF1 because agent 2 is not JF1 of
agent 1. Otherwise, allocating one item to agent 1 and three
items to agent 2 is JF1 but it is clearly neither EF1 nor PO. 
We conclude that common assumptions such as normalised
utilities and ignoring agents with zero utilities might be too
strong in our study. For this reason, we do not make any of
them throughout our work unless we explicitly mention it.
6 JF1 with mixed items
Consider again the Foodbank problem from the beginning of
the paper. In this particular context, JF1 would somehow min-
imize the inequalities between the people’s levels of satisfac-
tion with the received food. Unfortunately, there are such
settings where some agent like some items that another agent
dislike. Thus, the utility levels of such agents in each alloca-
tion diverge from each other. As a result, none of the alloca-
tions is JF1.
Proposition 1. There are problems with 2 agents and nor-
malised additive utilities for 2 mixed items and 1 bad, in
which no allocation is JF1.
Proof. Let us consider a problem with 2 mixed items, 1 bad
and 2 agents, having the following normalised utilities.
a b c
agent 1 1 1 −4
agent 2 −1 −1 0
Suppose that a JF1 allocation exist in this problem. We
let A denote such an allocation. We consider two cases. We
derive a contradiction in each case.
Case 1: Let |{a, b} ∩ A1| ≥ 2 hold. If c ∈ A2, then
u1(A1) = 2 whereas u2(A2) = 0. Hence, A cannot be JF1
because u2(A2) < 1 ≤ u1(A1\{o}) for each o ∈ {a, b}∩A1.
If c ∈ A1, then u1(A1) = −2 whereas u2(A2) = 0. Now,
A cannot be JF1 as well because of u2(c) = 0 and, therefore,
u1(A1) < 0 ≤ u2(A2) = u2(A2 ∪ {c}).
Case 2: Let |{a, b} ∩ A1| < 2 hold. If c ∈ A1,
then u1(A1) ≤ −3 whereas u2(A2) ≥ −2. But, then
u1(A1) < −2 ≤ u2(A2) = u2(A2 ∪ {c}) holds. If
c ∈ A2, then u1(A1) ≥ 0 whereas u2(A2) ≤ −1. Now,
u2(A2) < 0 = u1(A1 \ {o}) for each o ∈ {a, b} ∩ A1 and
u2(A2) < 1 ≤ u1(A1 ∪ {o}) for each o ∈ {a, b} ∩A2. 
This result compares favorably against an axiomatic prop-
erty such as envy-freeness up to some item in the sense that
EF1 allocations exist in each problem [Aziz et al., 2019a].
In response to this axiomatic result, we study the following
computational question related to JF1 allocations.
POSSIBLEJF1(POSSIBLEJF1ANDPO)
Data: a division problem ([n], [m], (ua(o))n×m)
Result: is there an JF1 (JF1 and PO) allocation?
We relate this problem to the well-knownNP-hard problem
X3C (i.e. exact cover by 3-sets) [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
In fact, we observe that each instance of X3C can be reduced
in polynomial time to an instance of POSSIBLEJF1. We use
this in our next result.
X3C Data: a set X = {x1, . . . , x3q} for some q ∈
N≥2 and a collection C = {C|C ⊆ X, |C| = 3}
Result: is there C′ ⊆ C s.t. ∪C∈C′ = X?
Theorem 1. In fair division of mixed manna and normalised
additive utilities, POSSIBLEJF1 is NP-hard.
Proof. The X3C problem is NP-hard whenever |C| > q. It
remains NP-hard whenever |C| > 3q. To see this, we note
that each instance with at most 3q 3-sets can be reduced to an
instance with strictly more than 3q 3-sets by simply copying a
given 3-set 3q−|C|+1 times (i.e.≥ 1 time). For this reason,
we assume that |C| > 3q holds.
We next present the polynomial-time reduction from X3C
to POSSIBLEJF1. Let X = {x1, . . . , x3q}, q ≥ 2 and C =
{C1, . . . , CQ}. The set of agents is [Q+1]. The set of items is
{x1, . . . , x3q, y11 , y21 , y31 . . . , y1Q−q+1, y2Q−q+1, y3Q−q+1, z}.
Let M ∈ N≥0 be such that M ≥ 3Q − 3q + 7 holds. The
utilities of agents for items are:
• for agent a ∈ [Q]: ua(xi) is 1 if xi ∈ Ca and else −M ,
ua(y
j
k) = 1 and ua(z) = 0,
• for agent (Q + 1): uQ+1(xi) = 1, uQ+1(yjk) = 1 and
uQ+1(z) = −(3q − 3)M − 3q + 3.
We note that the agents’ utilities for the set of items are
normalised and sum up to −(3q − 3)M + 3+ 3(Q− q + 1).
We next prove that there is an exact cover by 3-sets in the
instance of X3C iff there is a JF1 allocation in the instance of
POSSIBLEJF1.
We begin with the “only if” direction. Let C′ be an ex-
act cover for X . Hence, |C′| = q and Ca ∩ Cb = ∅
for each Ca, Cb ∈ C′ with Ca 6= Cb. Wlog, let C′ =
{C1, . . . , Cq}. We construct the following allocation: Aa =
Ca for a ∈ {1, . . . , q}, Ab = {y1b−q, y2b−q, y3b−q} for b ∈
{q + 1, . . . , Q,Q+ 1}. Wlog, give item z to agent 1 because
u1(z) = 0: A1 = A1 ∪ {z}. Each agent receives utility of
exactly 3 in A. Hence, A satisfies JF1.
We continue with the “if” direction. Let A be a JF1 allo-
cation. We let N denote the set of agents who receive the
xs. Wlog, N = {1, . . . , l}. We note that l ≤ 3q because the
number of xs is 3q. Hence, each agent from [Q+1] \N does
not receive any item from the xs. We note that there are at
least two agents in [Q + 1] \ N because Q ≥ 3q + 1 and,
therefore, Q+ 1− l ≥ Q+ 1− 3q ≥ 2 hold. Hence, there is
an agent from [Q], say a, such that ua(Aa) ≥ 0.
Let us assume that z ∈ AQ+1. Therefore, uQ+1(AQ+1) ≤
−M holds by the choices of M and q even if agent (Q +
1) receive all items. But, then we have uQ+1(AQ+1) <
0 ≤ ua(Aa). For each o ∈ Aa with ua(o) > 0, it
follows uQ+1(AQ+1) < 0 ≤ ua(Aa \ {o}) because of
Aa ∩ {x1, . . . , x3q} = ∅. Further, uQ+1(AQ+1) < 0 ≤
ua(Aa ∪{z}) = ua(Aa) because of ua(z) = 0. We note that
z is the only bad in AQ+1. Hence, A cannot satisfy JF1.
We conclude z 6∈ AQ+1 and uQ+1(AQ+1) ≥ 0. Let us
next assume that there is an agent b ∈ [Q] who receive at least
one item valued with −M . By the choice of M , it follows
that ub(Ab) ≤ 3Q − 3q + 6 −M ≤ −1 holds. This implies
ub(Ab) < uQ+1(AQ+1). Moreover, we note that each o in
Ab with ub(o) = −M is such that uQ+1(o) = 1. Therefore,
ub(Ab) < 1 ≤ uQ+1(AQ+1 ∪ {o}). For each pure good o in
AQ+1, it also follows ub(Ab) < 0 ≤ uQ+1(AQ+1 \{o}). We
derive again a contradiction with the JF1 of A.
We conclude that each agent b ∈ [Q] receives xs and ys
valued with 1. This holds for agent (Q+1) as well. It follows
that the sum of agents’ utilities in A is 3Q+3. If uc(Ac) ≥ 4
for some c ∈ [Q+1], then ud(Ad) ≤ 2 for some d ∈ [Q+1]
with d 6= c. In this case, ud(Ad) < uc(Ac). Also, ud(Ad) ≤
2 < 3 = uc(Ac \ {o}) holds for each o ∈ Ac with uc(o) = 1.
If uc(Ac) ≤ 2 for some c ∈ [Q + 1], then ud(Ad) ≥ 4 for
some d ∈ [Q+ 1] with d 6= c. Hence, A falsifies JF1.
We conclude ue(Ae) = 3 for each e ∈ [Q + 1]. As the
number of the xs and ys is 3(Q + 1), it follows that each
e ∈ [Q+1] receives 3 of these items. Consequently, q agents
receive the xs and Q− q+ 1 agents receive the ys in A. This
implies that l = q and N = {1, . . . , q} hold. We note that
Af ∩ Ag = ∅ holds for each f, g ∈ N with f 6= g. We can
finally construct an exact cover by 3-sets forX by uniting the
bundles of the agents in N : ∪h∈NAh = X . 
It follows by this result that checking whether JF10, JFX
or JFX0 (and PO) allocations exist is intractable. Otherwise,
we would reach a contradiction with our complexity result.
7 JFX0 and EFX0 without mixed items
The presence of mixed items in the problem may make it im-
possible to achieve even the weakest concept JF1. By com-
parison, the strongest concepts JFX0 and EFX0 might be vi-
olated by any allocation in the problem even if we remove
the mixed items. This follows because some moved items in
some allocations are valued with zero marginal utilities.
Proposition 2. There are problems with 2 agents and nor-
malised additive utilities for 1 pure good and 2 bads, in which
no allocation is JFX0 or EFX0.
Proof. Let us consider 2 agents, 1 pure good and 2 bads. We
let both agents like the good but dislike different bads.
a b c
agent 1 2 −1 0
agent 2 2 0 −1
By the symmetry of the agents’ utilities for item a, we
consider only four allocations: A = ({a, b}, {c}), B =
({a, c}, {b}), C = ({b, c}, {a}), D = ({a, b, c}, ∅).
We argue that none of these allocations is JFX0 or EFX0.
To see this for EFX0, we give one violation of this property
for each allocation: (1) u2(A2 \ {c}) = 0 < 2 = u2(A1), (2)
u2(B2 \ {b}) = 0 < 1 = u2(B1), (3) u1(C1 \ {b}) = 0 <
2 = u1(C2) and (4) u2(D2) = 0 < 1 = u2(D1 \ {b}).
We next give all violations of JFX0 for each allocation: (1)
u2(A2) = −1 < 1 = u1(A1 ∪ {c}), (2) u2(B2) = 0 < 2 =
u1(B1\{c}), u2(B2) = 0 < 1 = u1(B1∪{b}) (3) u1(C1) =
−1 < 2 = u2(C2 ∪{b}), u1(C1) = −1 < 1 = u2(C2 ∪{c})
and (4) u2(D2) = 0 < 1 = u1(D1 \ {c}).
This result diverges from existing results. For example,
EFX0 allocations exist in problems with 2 agents and goods
[Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]. Also, JFX0 allocations ex-
ist in problems with any number of agents and pure goods
[Gourve`s et al., 2014]. It follows that adding bads to such
problems could break these results.
8 JFX without mixed items
JFX0 coincides with JFX whenever the problem contains pure
goods and pure bads. This is not true in problems with goods
and bads. In this case, JFX0 allocations may not exist whereas
JFX allocations are guaranteed to exist. For example, the
leximin++ solution is JFX.
Theorem 2. In fair division of goods and bads, each
leximin++ allocation is JFX.
Proof. Let A be an leximin++ allocation. Suppose that
A is not JFX for a pair of agents a, b ∈ [n] with a 6= b.
Wlog, ua(Aa) < ub(Ab). Also, at least one of the following
conditions holds: (1) ua(Aa) < ub(Ab ∪ {o}) for some o ∈
Aa with ua(Aa) < ua(Aa \ {o}) or (2) ua(Aa) < ub(Ab \
{o}) for some o ∈ Ab with ub(Ab) > ub(Ab \ {o}). We
consider two cases.
Case 1: Let (1) hold for bad o ∈ Aa. We argue that
the marginal utility of agent b for item o is strictly negative.
Suppose first the opposite, namely ub(Ab) = ub(Ab ∪ {o}).
We next move item o from the bundle Aa to the bundle Ab.
Let C denote this new allocation. That is, Ca = Aa \ {o},
Cb = Ab ∪{o} and Cc = Ac for each c ∈ [n] \ {a, b}. In this
case, |Cb| = |Ab|+ 1.
The a’s utility in C is greater than ua(Aa): ua(Ca) =
ua(Aa \ {o}) > ua(Aa). The b’s utility in C is also greater
than ua(Aa): ub(Cb) = ub(Ab ∪ {o}) = ub(Ab) > ua(Aa).
Even though the number of bads in Ca is smaller than in Aa,
recall that the a’s utility in A is maximized before the a’ bun-
dle size is optimized. Therefore, C ++ A and A cannot be
leximin++. This conclusion leads to a contradiction.
Consequently, ub(Ab) 6= ub(Ab ∪ {o}) must hold. By it
and the fact that o is a bad, it follows ub(Ab) > ub(Ab∪{o}).
That is, the marginal utilities of both agents are strictly neg-
ative. Let us consider again the above allocation C. Sim-
ilarly, ua(Ca) > ua(Aa) and uc(Cc) = uc(Ac) for each
c ∈ [n] \ {a, b}. But, this time ub(Cb) > ua(Aa) holds by
the violation of JFX in (1). Again, A cannot be leximin++.
Case 2: Let (2) hold for good o ∈ Ab. Similarly, we prove
that the marginal utility of agent a for item o is strictly pos-
itive. Again, let us first assume that the opposite holds, i.e.
ua(Aa) 6= ua(Aa ∪ {o}). We next move only item o from
Ab toAa, constructing a new allocation. We letB denote this
allocation: Ba = Aa ∪ {o}, Bb = Ab \ {o} and Bc = Ac for
each c ∈ [n] \ {a, b}. Consequently, |Ba| = |Aa|+ 1.
The a’s utility in B is the same as in A but the size of their
bundle of goods in B is strictly larger than in A. The b’s
utility in B is strictly larger than the a’s utility in A. Indeed,
ub(Bb) = ub(Ab \ {o}) > ua(Aa) by the violation of JFX
in (2). These clues imply that B is larger than A under ++.
Therefore, A cannot be leximin++. So, it must be the case
that ua(Aa) 6= ua(Aa ∪ {o}) holds.
We observe that the problem has got no mixed items. As
item o is a good, it follows that ua(Aa) < ua(Aa ∪ {o})
holds. Let us consider again the above allocation B. Now,
the a’s utility and the size of their bundle of goods in B are
strictly larger than these corresponding utility and bundle size
inA. Also, ub(Bb) > ua(Aa) and uc(Bc) = uc(Ac) for each
c ∈ [n] \ {a, b}. Again, A cannot be leximin++. 
This characterization result is tight. Indeed, if we relaxed
JFX to JFX0 in it, then we would derive an impossibility re-
sult by Proposition 2.
9 JF10 without mixed items
The leximin++ solution is JFX and it can be computed in
O(nm) time. This might be fine for small m. However, m
can be much larger than n in practice. For this reason, we may
wish to return an allocation that satisfies the weaker concept
JF10. Surprisingly, we can do this in O(mn) time by using
Algorithm 1. We next describe this algorithm.
Basically, Algorithm 1 allocates the items one-by-one to
agents in an arbitrary order. If the current item is a pure good,
then it goes to an agent with minimum utility. If it is a pure
bad, then it goes to an agent with maximum utility, supposing
the item is given to them. Otherwise, it goes to an agent who
has zero utility for it.
The key idea behind the inductive proof of the correctness
of the algorithm relies on the fact that it differentiates between
pure goods, pure bads and indifferent items. Thus, it is guar-
anteed that if the partial allocation at a given round were not
JF10, then the partial allocation at the previous round would
also violate JF10.
Algorithm 1 Jealousy-freeness up to some item
1: procedure JF10ALLOCATION([n], [m], (ua)n)
2: ∀a ∈ [n] : Aa ← ∅
3: for t = 1 : m do
4: if ∀c ∈ [n] : uc(Ac ∪ {t}) > uc(Ac) then
5: a← argminb∈[n] ub(Ab)
6: else if ∀c ∈ [n] : uc(Ac ∪ {t}) < uc(Ac) then
7: a← argmaxb∈[n] ub(Ab ∪ {t})
8: else
9: a← arg{b ∈ [n]|ub(Ab ∪ {t}) = ub(Ab)}
10: Aa ← Aa ∪ {t}
11: return A
Theorem 3. In fair division of goods and bads, Algorithm 1
returns an JF10 allocation.
Proof. Algorithm 1 gives the items in rounds 1 to m. We let
At denote the allocation constructed up to round t. We will
prove that each At is JF10 by induction on t.
In the base case when t = 1, the proof is trivial. In the
hypothesis, let us assume that At−1 is JF10. In the step case,
Algorithm 1 allocates item t. Wlog, let agent 1 receive t.
Thus, the bundle of each other agent in At is the same as in
At−1. Hence, each two agents a, b ∈ [n] \ {1} with a 6= b are
JF10 of each other in At by the hypothesis. For this reason,
we next consider three remaining cases.
Case 1: If u1(At) = u1(At−1), then agent 1’s utility in
At is equal to their utility in At−1. Hence, the allocation At
remains JF10.
Case 2: If u1(At) < u1(At−1), then t must be a pure bad.
By the hypothesis, it follows that each other agent is JF10 of
agent 1 in At simply because 1’s utility in At is strictly lower
than 1’s utility in At−1. Consequently, we only prove that
agent 1 is JF10 of each agent a ∈ [n] \ {1}. If this were not
the case for some a ∈ [n]\{1}, then u1(At1) < ua(Ata∪{t})
would hold. This would imply u1(At−11 ∪{t}) < ua(At−1a ∪
{t}) because ofAt1 = At−11 ∪{t}, Ata = At−1a and contradict
the fact that u1(At−11 ∪ {t}) ≥ ua(At−1a ∪ {t}) holds.
Case 3: If u1(At) > u1(At−1), then t must be a pure
good. As agent 1 is JF10 of any other agent in At−1, they
remain JF10 of them in At simply because 1’s utility in At is
strictly greater than 1’s utility in At−1. Hence, we only prove
that each agent a ∈ [n] \ {1} is JF10 of agent 1. As agent
1 gets item t, it must be that ua(At−1a ) ≥ u1(At−11 ) holds.
Also, ua(Ata) = ua(A
t−1
a ) and u1(A
t−1
1 ) = u1(A
t
1 \ {t}).
Hence, ua(Ata) ≥ u1(At1 \ {t}). 
10 Pareto-optimality
We already mentioned that each leximin allocation is PO.
Furthermore, jealousy-freeness up to one item and PO might
be incompatible in problems with mixed items. Unfortu-
nately, this incompatibility continues to hold even in prob-
lems with goods.
This result reveals the technical difference between the lex-
imin and leximin++ solutions. The former one is PO but may
not be JF1 because it could give to an agent high utility whilst
the latter one is JFX but may not be PO because it could give
to an agent an item for which they have zero utility.
Proposition 3. There are problems with 3 agents and nor-
malised additive utilities for 3 goods, where no PO allocation
is JF1.
Proof. Let us consider a simple problem with 3 goods and 3
agents, having the following utilities for the items.
a b c
agent 1 13
1
3
1
3
agent 2 1 0 0
agent 3 1 0 0
We note that giving a to agent 2 and b, c to agent 3 is JF1
but not PO (leximin++). In contrast, giving a to either agent
2 or 3 and b, c to agent 1 (leximin), or all items to agent 1
is PO. It is easy to see that such an allocation violates JF1
because agent 2 or 3 has got no items and is, therefore, jealous
even up to one item of agent 1. 
By comparison, Freeman et al. [2019] showed that JF10
and PO allocations may not exist in problems with normal-
ized and 0/1 (i.e. binary) utilities. They also proved that de-
ciding whether such allocations exist in problems with non-
normalised and non-binary utilities is NP-hard.
We strengthen this complexity result to the weaker combi-
nation JF1 and PO in problems with normalised and binary
utilities.
Theorem 4. In fair division of goods and normalised additive
and 0/1 utilities, POSSIBLEJF1ANDPO is NP-hard.
Proof. Let us consider the reduction in Theorem 1. Suppose
that we remove agent (Q + 1) and items y1Q−q+1, y
2
Q−q+1,
y3Q−q+1, z. Further, suppose that we substitute each −M
with 0. This transformation gives us a problem withQ agents,
3Q goods and normalised 0/1 utilities. Let C denote an exact
cover for X . We can construct an allocation AC as in the
proof of Theorem 1. It follows thatAC is JF1. This allocation
is also PO because each agent receive items valued with 1.
Let there be an JF1 and PO allocation A. By PO, it must be
the case that each agent receive items valued with 1. Hence,
the sum of agents’ utilities in A is equal to 3Q. This is only
possible whenever each agent get utility 3. We can construct
an exact cover CA for X as in the proof of Theorem 1. 
The impossibility result differs from the existence of EF1
and PO allocations in the case of 0/1 utilities. In fact, such
allocations can be computed in polynomial time by the online
algorithm BALANCED LIKE from [Aleksandrov et al., 2015].
Benade et al. [2018] made this observation.
The result further breaks whenever there are just pure items
in the problem (i.e. non-zero marginal utilities). In fact, an
allocation in such a problem is leximin++ iff it is leximin. By
Remark 1 and Theorem 2, it follows that the leximin solution
is JFX and the leximin++ solution is PO.
We can safely extend these guarantees to problems where
agents are indifferent for some bads. Indeed, the leximin so-
lution is PO and, for this reason, it gives each such bad to
some agent who has zero marginal utility for it. These deci-
sions are optimal from a JFX perspective as well.
Corollary 1. In fair division of pure goods and bads, each
leximin allocation is JFX and PO.
This result is tight by Proposition 2. This also follows by
an existing result of Freeman et al. [2020] who observed that
JFX0 and PO might not be attainable in problems with bads.
11 Envy-freeness up to one item
JF1 and EF1 might be unachievable in problems where some
agents have zero total utility for the items (see Example 3).
For this reason, we assume in this section that there are no
such agents. We present indeed some positive results under
this common assumption.
11.1 The case of 2 agents
JF1 and EF1 might as well be violated by each allocation
in problems with non-normalised utilities for bads. This is
because JF1 may bias the allocation towards agents with the
greatest total utility for bads. Thus, such an allocation may
give all bads to a single agent. As a result, it could easily
falsify an axiomatic property such as EF1.
Proposition 4. There are problems with 2 agents and addi-
tive utilities for 2 pure bads, where no JF1 allocation is EF1.
Proof. The proof is in terms of the below counter-example.
a b
agent 1 −1 −1
agent 2 −3 −3
To achieve JF1, we argue that we should give both items to
agent 1. Otherwise, agent 2 would get disutility of at least−3
but be still jealous up to one item of agent 1 because shifting
one item from 2’s bundle to 1’s bundle would make 1’s disu-
tility at most −2. Well, let us then give the items to agent 1.
Clearly, this violates EF1 because agent 1 envies agent 2 even
after removing any item from their 1’s bundle. 
It follows that the leximin and leximin++ solutions might
violate EF1 in some problems with non-normalised utilities.
At the same time, it seems to us that normalisation occurs
often in practice. For example, some web-applications on
Spliddit ask agents to share a fixed total (i.e. normalised) util-
ity for items [Caragiannis et al., 2016].
As a response, we will prove shortly that the impossibility
result breaks in two contexts with normalised additive utili-
ties: (1) JFX, EFX and PO for pure goods and bads; (2) JFX
and EFX for goods and bads. However, we first give another
strong result. Namely, EFX and PO are always attainable in
problems with such utilities for arbitrary items.
Theorem 5. In fair division of mixed manna with 2 agents
and normalised additive utilities, each leximin allocation sat-
isfies EFX and PO.
Proof. Let A be an leximin allocation. By Remark 1, A
is PO. Suppose that A is not EFX. Wlog, let agent 1 be not
EFX of agent 2. Hence, it must be the case that (1) u1(A1 \
{o}) < u1(A2) holds for some o ∈ A1 with u1(o) < 0 or
(2) u1(A1) < u1(A2 \ {o}) holds for some o ∈ A2 with
u1(o) > 0. We consider two cases.
If (1) holds for o ∈ A1 with u1(o) < 0, then u2(o) < 0
by the PO of A. Let us consider bundles S1 = A1 \ {o} and
S2 = A2 ∪ {o} in this case.
If (2) holds for o ∈ A2 with u1(o) > 0, then u2(o) > 0
by the PO of A. Let us consider bundles S1 = A1 ∪ {o} and
S2 = A2 \ {o} in this case.
We construct an allocation B and show that the minimum
utility in B is greater than the minimum utility in A, reaching
a contradiction with the leximin-optimality of A. We let
B1 = argmin
S∈{S1,S2}
u2(S),
B2 = argmax
S∈{S1,S2}
u2(S).
By construction, u2(B2) ≥ u2(B1) holds in B. Moreover,
u1(S1) > u1(A1) and u1(S2) > u1(A1) hold in each of the
cases (1) and (2). These inequalities follow because agent 1’s
utilities for the moved item are non-zero and agent 1 is not
EFX of agent 2. We conclude u1(B1) > u1(A1).
We have u1(A1) + u1(A2) = c and u2(A1) + u2(A2) = c
for some c ∈ R by the fact that the agents’ utilities are nor-
malised. As u1(A1) < u1(A2), it follows u1(A1) < c/2. By
the PO of A, u2(A2) > u2(A1). Hence, u2(A1) < c/2
and u2(A2) > c/2. Further, as u2(B2) ≥ u2(B1) and
u2(B1) + u2(B2) = c, it follows u2(B2) ≥ c/2.
We are ready to derive the aforementioned contradiction:
min{u1(A1), u2(A2)} = u1(A1) < min{u1(B1), c/2} ≤
min{u1(B1), u2(B2)}. These follow because of u2(A2) >
c/2, u1(A1) < c/2, u1(A1) < u1(B1) and u2(B2) ≥ c/2.
The result follows. 
This result provides stronger guarantees than some exist-
ing results. For example, the MNW solution is guaranteed to
be EF1 and PO in problems with goods [Caragiannis et al.,
2016]. On the other hand, it may violate EF1 or PO in prob-
lems with mixed items (see [Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2019])
where the leximin solution remains EFX and PO.
By Corollary 1, the leximin solution is JFX in problems
with pure goods and bads. Furthermore, both the leximin and
leximin++ solutions induce now the same utilities but their
distributions of indifferent bads may differ. This is because
the leximin++ solution also gives each such bad to an agent
with zero utility for it. Hence, it is also JFX, EFX and PO.
Corollary 2. In fair division of pure goods and bads with 2
agents and normalised additive utilities, each leximin alloca-
tion is JFX, EFX and PO.
We cannot extend this result to problems where the agents
are indifferent for goods. However, Plaut and Roughgarden
[2018] argued that each such good (or even a mixed item in
our view) could be given to the agent who values it positively
prior to the allocation. Otherwise, we might lose the JF1 guar-
antees in the result.
Proposition 5. There are problems with 2 agents and nor-
malised additive utilities for 2 goods and 2 bads, where no
PO allocation is JF1.
Proof. Let us consider the below problem with 2 agents,
2 goods and 2 bads. We note that the agents’ utilities are
normalised.
a b c d
agent 1 1 1 −5 0
agent 2 0 0 0 −3
There is only one PO allocation (leximin). This one gives
items a, b, d to agent 1 and item c to agent 2. LetA denote this
allocation. We have u1(A1) = 2, u2(A2) = 0 and u2(A2) <
1 = u1(A1 \ {o}) for each o ∈ A1 with u1(o) > 0. Hence,
the allocation A violates JF1. 
This result implies that no PO allocation can satisfy both
EF1 and JF1, including the leximin solution. Nevertheless,
we might wish to drop PO and achieve only EFX and JFX.
Surprisingly, we can do this in each fair division problem
without mixed items. For this purpose, we now need the
leximin++ solution.
Theorem 6. In fair division of goods and bads with 2 agents
and normalised additive utilities, each leximin++ allocation
is JFX and EFX.
Proof. Let A denote an leximin++ allocation. By Theo-
rem 2, JFX follows. We next prove EFX. Suppose that agent
1 is not EFX of agent 2. Consequently, u1(A1) < u1(A2).
Further, as the utilities of agent 1 are normalised, it follows
that u1(A1) < c/2 holds for some c ∈ R. We construct a
new allocation B as in Theorem 5.
We have u1(B1) > u1(A1). We also show that u2(B2) >
u1(A1) holds. The argument for it is by contradiction. Let
u2(B2) ≤ u1(A1) hold. By the definition of B, u2(B2) ≥
u2(B1). Therefore, u2(B2) < c/2 and u2(B1) < c/2 follow
because u1(A1) < c/2. This is in conflict with u2(B1) +
u2(B2) = c. Hence, u2(B2) > u1(A1).
Let k = min{u1(A1), u2(A2)}. We derive u1(B1) > k
and u2(B2) > k. The minimum utility in B is strictly greater
than the minimum utility in A. As an leximin++ allocation
maximizes this utility before the bundle size, it follows that
B is strictly larger than A under ++. This means that A
cannot be leximin++. We reached a contradiction. 
The leximin and leximin++ solutions are both intractable
even with 2 agents. We can however compute an EFX allo-
cation in O(mn) time. For this purpose, we can use the “cut-
and-choose” protocol from [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]
with the EFX algorithm for identical utilities from [Aleksan-
drov and Walsh, 2019] as a sub-routine instead of leximin++.
By Proposition 2, the possibility results break whenever
we relax JFX to JFX0 or EFX to EFX0. Hence, they are tight.
This is also in-line with an impossibility result for EFX0 and
PO allocations of goods [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].
11.2 The case of 3 or more agents
In the case of 2 agents, normalisation plays a crucial role in
achieving JFX and EFX in problems with goods and bads.
However, normalisation may not help us whenever there are
more agents in the problem. A JF1 allocation in such prob-
lems could give to some agent a single item and to another
agent just enough items so that EF1 become violated.
Proposition 6. There are problems with 3 agents and nor-
malised additive utilities for 6 pure goods, where no JF1 al-
location is EF1.
Proof. Let us consider the below problem with 3 agents
and 6 pure goods a to f , where  ∈ (0, 15 ). We note that the
agents’ utilities are normalised.
a b c d e f
agent 1 6− 5     
agent 2 6− 5     
agent 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
We claim that none of the allocations in this problem is
JF1 and EF1. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that
some allocation, say A, satisfies both JF1 and EF1. We note
that A gives a to either agent 1, 2 or 3. Hence, one of the
agents 1 or 2 is not allocated this item. We let xA ∈ {1, 2}
denote this agent. Hence, agent xA receive at most 5 items of
b to f , each worth utility .
As A is JF1, agent 3 must receive at most one of a to f .
Otherwise, u3(A3) ≥ 2. But, then agent xA is not JF1 of
them because uxA(AxA) ≤ 5 < 1 ≤ u3(A3 \ {o}) holds
for each o ∈ A3. For the same reason, agent 3 must receive
at least one of a to f . Otherwise, u3(A3) = 0. Hence, they
are not JF1 of agent xA or the agent in {1, 2} \ {xA}. We
conclude that u3(A3) = 1 holds and consider two cases.
Case 1: Let a be allocated to agent 1 or 2. Wlog, let a ∈
A1. As u3(A3) = 1, agent 3 must receive one item of b to f
and the remaining 4 of these items are distributed inA among
agents 1 and 2. Therefore, at least one of these agents gets at
least two of these items. If this were agent 1, then let wlog
b, c ∈ A1. Or, {a, b, c} ⊆ A1. We derive that u3(A3) < 2 ≤
u3(A1 \ {o}) holds for each o ∈ A1. Hence, A is not EF1.
If agent 1 got at most one item of b to f , then agent 2 got at
least three of them. Again, A is not EF1.
Case 2: Let a be allocated to agent 3. That is, a ∈ A3. As
u3(A3) = 1, agent 3 do not receive any item of b to f . We
conclude that these 5 items are allocated in A to agents 1 and
2. It follows from this conclusion that at least one of these
agents receives at least three of these items in A. Wlog, let
{b, c, d} ⊆ A2. But, then u3(A3) < 2 ≤ u3(A2 \ {o}) for
each o ∈ A2. This fact implies that the allocation A cannot
satisfy EF1 in this case as well. 
This result implies that the leximin and leximin++ solu-
tions could falsify EF1. It also slightly strengthens an ex-
isting impossibility result for JF10 and EF1 allocations in
problems with 3 agents and non-normalised utilities for pure
goods [Freeman et al., 2019]. For JF10, we can use Algo-
rithm 1. For EF1, we can use the generalized envy-free algo-
rithm from [Aziz et al., 2019a].
11.3 The case of n ≥ 3 or fewer items
Let us consider a problem with at least 3 agents and as many
goods and bads as agents. By Proposition 3, PO may be in-
compatible with JF1 and EF1 in problems with normalised
utilities. For this reason, we may wonder if JF1 and EF1
are compatible under normalised utilities. Unfortunately, this
might as well be impossible.
Proposition 7. There are problems with 3 agents and nor-
malised additive utilities for 3 pure bads, where no JF1 allo-
cation is EF1.
Proof. The proof uses a simple counter-problem with 3
agents whose utilities for 3 pure bads sum up to −30.
a b c
agent 1 −28 −1 −1
agent 2 −24 −3 −3
agent 3 −16 −7 −7
To achieve EF1, it is easy to see that each agent should get
exactly one item. Otherwise, an agent with at least two items
would not be EF1 of an agent with zero items. Hence, there
are 6 EF1 allocations.
For each allocation of a, there are two symmetrical EF1
allocations giving b and c to different agents. For this reason,
let us consider only 3 EF1 allocations: A = ({a}, {b}, {c}),
B = ({b}, {a}, {c}) and C = ({c}, {b}, {a}).
We simply show that each of these allocations violates JF1:
(1) u1(A1) = −28 < −27 = u2(A2 ∪ {a}), (2) u2(B2) =
−24 < −23 = u3(B3 ∪ {a}) and (3) u2(C2) = −3 < −2 =
u1(C1 ∪ {b}). The result follows. 
The case of pure bads contrasts axiomatically and compu-
tationally with the case of pure goods. In this case, JFX, EFX
and PO allocations exist. For example, the allocation that
maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities for at most one pure
good satisfies these three properties. Such an allocation can
be computed in O(n3) time by using a matching procedure
such as the hungarian method [Kuhn, 1955].
This possibility result is for the case of as many pure goods
as agents. From this perspective, it extends the contribution
of the impossibility result in Proposition 6 where none of the
allocations, maximizing the sum of agents’ utilities for bun-
dles of any number of pure goods, satisfies JF1 and EF1. This
holds when the number m of items is only twice the number
n of agents, arguably the first natural case after m = n.
Finally, consider a problem with normalised (not necessar-
ily additive) utilities for at most n goods (bads). Giving the
goods (bads) to different agents is JFX and EFX (EFX). Such
an allocation can be computed in O(n) time. We submit it as
an interesting open problem whether allocations that satisfy
only JFX or EFX can be computed efficiently in the case of
at most n goods and bads.
12 General bundle utilities
We mostly assumed thus far that the agents’ utilities for bun-
dles are additive. For this reason, we further consider the case
of general bundle utilities, when agents can assign arbitrary
real-valued utilities to bundles. Examples of such utilities
are sub-additive utilities and sub-modular utilities [Dobzin-
ski and Vondra´k, 2013; Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]. We
are interested in which of our possibility results transfer to
this case.
Let us consider agent a ∈ [n], item o ∈ [m] and bundle
M ⊆ [m] \ {o}. We say that o is good for a with respect to
M if ua(M ∪ {o}) ≥ ua(M). We refer to o as pure good
whenever ua(M ∪ {o}) > ua(M). Similarly, we say that o
is bad for a with respect to M if ua(M ∪ {o}) ≤ ua(M).
We refer to o as pure bad whenever ua(M ∪ {o}) < ua(M).
Further, let us consider another agent b ∈ [n] and another
bundle N ⊆ [m] \ (M ∪ {o}). Thus, we say that o mixed if
ua(M ∪ {o}) > ua(M) and ub(N ∪ {o}) < ub(N).
In a problem with mixed items, there is an allocation, an
item and two agents such that one of the agents’ marginal
utilities for the item in the allocation is strictly positive and
the other one is strictly negative. In a problem without mixed
items, all agents reach a consensus on whether a given item is
good or bad in a given allocation. In a problem with pure
goods and bads, the agents’ marginal utilities for a given
item in a given allocation are either all strictly positive or all
weakly negative.
Jealousy-freeness up to one item Theorems 2 and 3 fur-
ther hold for problems with general utilities for goods and
bads. This follows because their proofs do not use the fact
that the utilities are additive. However, Algorithm 1 would
now need an oracle access to the agents’ bundle utilities sim-
ply because their number could be exponential in m.
Pareto-optimality Corollary 1 further holds for problems
with general utilities for pure goods and bads.
Envy-freeness up to one item Theorem 5 holds for prob-
lems with 2 agents and normalised additive utilities. How-
ever, EFX and PO may be incompatible in problems with 2
agents and normalised general utilities for pure goods (i.e.
non-zero marginal utilities) [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].
As a consequence, Theorem 5 breaks with general utilities.
Even worse, there are such problems where no allocation
satisfies both JF1 and EF1, even under the assumption that
the agents’ utilities for the set of items are the same. Hence,
Theorem 6 also breaks. That is, the leximin++ or even lex-
imin solution may no longer satisfy even EF1 as we move to
normalised general problems with pure goods.
Proposition 8. There are problems with 2 agents and nor-
malised general utilities for 4 pure goods, where no JF1 allo-
cation is EF1.
Proof. Let us consider 2 agents and a set of goods [m],
where m ≥ 4. Define each agent’s utilities as follows: (1)
u1(S) = |S| for each S ⊆ [m] and (2) u2(S) = |S| for each
S such that S ⊂ [m] and u2([m]) = m, where  ∈ (0, 1m ).
We note that the agents’ utilities are normalised: u1(∅) =
u2(∅) = 0 and u1([m]) = u2([m]) = m. We also note that
the agents’ marginal utilities are strictly positive.
If agent 1 received at least two items, then their utility
would be at least 2. But, then agent 2 get at most (m − 2)
items and, hence, their utility is at most (m − 2). This is
strictly lower than 1 because of  < 1m . As a result, agent 2
is jealous of agent 1 even after the removal of any item from
1’s bundle. Hence, such an allocation cannot be JF1.
To achieve JF1, agent 1 should receive at most one item. If
they received no item, then they would not be JF1 of agent 2.
Hence, they receive one item and their utility is 1. However,
agent 2 now receive (m−1) items and agent 1’s utility for 2’s
bundle without one item is (m−2). This is at least 2 because
of m ≥ 4. Hence, such an allocation cannot be EF1. 
13 Discussion
We could attempt to tackle the impossibility results by relax-
ing further JF1 or EF1. For example, two natural approxi-
mations of EF1 for goods are EF2 from [Bilo` et al., 2019]
and PROP1 from [Conitzer et al., 2017]. We can construct
though problems as in Propositions 6 and 8 where neither EF2
nor PROP1 is compatible with JF1. Alternatively, we can ap-
proximate JF1 by relaxing the “up to one item” constraints to
“up to two items”. Say, we call this property JF2. We can
again give similar problems where JF2 is incompatible with
EF1. These observations suggest that further relaxations of
EF2 and JF2 also might not interact in some problems.
Even more, Algorithm 1 for JF10 allocations remind us of
the popular envy-graph algorithm for EF1 allocations [Lip-
ton et al., 2004]. Both algorithms allocate the items one-by-
one in some order. However, the envy-graph algorithm lets
agents exchange bundles of some previous items at each step.
By comparison, a notable advantage of Algorithm 1 is that it
makes the decision for the current item without re-allocating
any of the previous items or using information about any of
the next items. Hence, it can be adapted to work in online
environments such as the one in [Aleksandrov et al., 2015]
by inputting the items to it one-by-one.
14 Conclusions
We considered a fair division setting where agents assign util-
ities to bundles of indivisible items in a mixed manna. For
this model, we studied combinations of properties for con-
cepts such as jealousy-freeness up to one item, envy-freeness
up to one item and Pareto-optimality. We obtained many
possibility and impossibility results for such combinations.
We also studied computational tasks related to these combi-
nations: some of them exhibit exponential-time algorithms
(unless NP = P) and some others admit polynomial-time al-
gorithms. We summarized all our results in Table 1.
Our work opens up many questions for future work. For
example, how well perform the proposed solutions in sim-
ulations? Also, the leximin++ solution is unfortunately in-
tractable even when the agents’ utilities are specified in unary.
For this reason, we believe that it is natural to ask whether
there is a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for JFX alloca-
tions in this case? Further, the leximin++ solution is EFX in
problems with goods and general but identical utilities. It is,
therefore, also pertinent to ask if these guarantees extend to
problems with mixed manna?
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